Recent History

Lack of Resources to Fight Crime and Impunity

Law enforcement agencies—Civil Police Force, prosecutors, the courts—are all weak, under-resourced, outgunned, overmatched, intimidated, demoralized, even assuming they are free from corruption and subversion. Guatemala is in a vicious circle growing crime and weakening resources to fight it, and threatens to degenerate to the point that the country itself becomes an organized criminal enterprise.

CICIACS / CICIG

The combination of pressure from the UN and the USA, pushed the Portillo and Berger governments to allow intervention. Following the proper protocol, in January 2003, the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman made a formal proposal to the Guatemala Government; in March, the Government sent a formal request to the United Nations. In January 2004 the parties signed an agreement to establish a Comisión de de Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad (CICIACS) (Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations). According to the agreement, CICIACS would be charged with “investigating and dismantling illegal groups and clandestine security organizations responsible for threats and attacks against human rights defenders, members of the judiciary, witnesses, labor and other activists, and prosecuting those responsible for their formation and operation”.

Although CICIACS would work with the Guatemalan authorities, it would have the option of proceding independently when “in the view of the CICIACS Commissioner, a failure to initiate or continue a prosecution would significantly impede the ability of CICIACS to fulfill its mandate”. CICIACS would comprise a Commissioner appointed by the UN, international and national staff (prosecutors, defense lawyers, investigators, police and military personnel, forensic experts and information technology experts, among others), and a Secretariat, headed by an international official, responsible for support and administration. The structure of CICIACS is an acknowledgement that no Guatemalan institution can be trusted. The agreement granted the commission unprecedented powers, and stated explicitly that: “In the performance of their functions, members of CICIACS shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source.”

The Berger Administration, taking office in January 2004, formally supported the creation of CICIACS, but after four months of heated public debate ensued, during which opponents in congress (including those in the party of General Rios Montt and former President Portillo) argued that CICIACS would be a "a loss of national sovereignty" and would "breach the constitution", the two congressional commissions voted against the bill. In August 2004 the constitutional court declared several elements of the agreement to be unconstitutional.

Finally, in December, 2007, government of Guatema and the United Nations signed an amended agreement (now known the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, or CICIG) to establish a UN-led Commission to investigate the existence of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations operating in Guatemala and to promote the subsequent prosecution in local courts of individuals involved in these groups. CICIG began its work in early 2008. The WOLA website will provide continuing coverage of this issue.

Human Rights Abuses

There are constant reports of human rights violations in Guatemala. International human rights organizations having become so sensitized to the situation there, that it is difficult sometimes to gain any perspective as to whether the situation is improving or regressing.

Violence and Personal Security

Certainly ordinary citizens of Guatemala have the perception that the streets and countryside are more dangerous than ever. Gang violence has rendered many zones of the capital 'no-go' areas, and many of the towns and much of the countryside are plagued with all forms of disorganized crime and banditry. Bus drivers in the capital city have recently been targeted for robberies and shootings. Violence not only affects personal security and quality of life, but also greatly increases the costs for anyone trying to run a legitimate business or provide social services in Guatemala.


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Health & Equity Guatemala Overview History of Armed Conflict Recent History Society Health System Alta Verapaz Health Projects Social Justice	UN-Brokered Peace Accords Under President Ramiro de León Carpio, the UN-brokered peace process between the government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) proceeded step by step. Successive agreements were signed on human rights (March 1994), resettlement of displaced persons (June 1994), historical clarification (June 1994), and indigenous rights (March 1995). In September 1994 the UN established the Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala , which came to be known as MINUGUA. MINUGUA carried out verification and institution-building activities throughout the country. More than 250 human rights monitors, legal experts, indigenous specialists and police were posted throughout Guatemala , including its most remote areas. The process continued after the election of President Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen in January 1996, and by March there was an informal ceasefire with the URNG, then finally in December 1996 a definitive ceasefire and the conclusion of the formal peace accords, whereupon the UN added 155 military observers and medical personnel for three months. The observer group verified compliance with the ceasefire, including the formal cessation of hostilities, the separation and concentration of the respective forces and disarmament and demobilization of the few thousand remaining URNG combatants. Originally, MINUGUA was to complete its mission by 2000, but because of slow progress, the mission was extended until 2004, when it was terminated, having achieved some, but by no means all, of its objectives. MINUGUA’s Final Report is an excellent, balanced, summary of the successes and reversals experienced by Guatemala since the signing of the Peace Accords. Summarizing here very briefly: the peace process advanced, albeit very slowly, during the administration of President Arzú (1996-1999); it actually regressed under the administration of President Portillo (2000-2003); and it finally began to move forward again, if very slowly, under the government of President Berger, and the current government of President Colom. Ongoing Issues Impunity The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) verified that the main perpetrators of the violence in the years of conflict were in the army and its allied organizations, but there are daunting obstacles protecting these perpetrators from justice. The judicial system is weak at all levels, lacking experienced personnel and resources. Intimidation and subversion by criminal elements are common. Procedural delays are seemingly endless, evidence is lost, convictions rare. The army and other state institutions simply stonewall, refusing to or provide information or cooperate in any way. The weak civil police can neither investigate effectively, nor protect judges, prosecutors, or witnesses from intimidation and actual violence. Consequently, many known perpetrators enjoy impunity, many occupying prominent positions in the army, government and business. Organized Crime Guatemala lies on the drug route from Colombia to the United States , and as such is an important warehousing and transit point. There are no doubt also lucrative enterprises smuggling vehicles, weapons, money, human beings, and whatever else is of value, to or from the United States . And of course, even in countries as poor as Guatemala , there are always great domestic criminal opportunities—looting the public treasury, for example. Indeed, in a country with so little successful legitimate industry, it is not surprising that criminal enterprises are so inordinately influential. Nor perhaps, given the nature of the opportunities, is it surprising that the most successful criminals would be those with backgrounds in the customs service or the army, and specifically those with intelligence training, or training in drug interdiction. It is startling to realize, however, that many of the worst perpetrators of crimes against the population during the civil war are today the kingpins of the criminal enterprises, and that those same individuals openly retain their connections to public officials. These connections are shown convincingly in the Hidden Powers report by the Washington Office on Latin America.	Lack of Resources to Fight Crime and Impunity Law enforcement agencies—Civil Police Force, prosecutors, the courts—are all weak, under-resourced, outgunned, overmatched, intimidated, demoralized, even assuming they are free from corruption and subversion. Guatemala is in a vicious circle growing crime and weakening resources to fight it, and threatens to degenerate to the point that the country itself becomes an organized criminal enterprise. CICIACS / CICIG The combination of pressure from the UN and the USA, pushed the Portillo and Berger governments to allow intervention. Following the proper protocol, in January 2003, the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman made a formal proposal to the Guatemala Government; in March, the Government sent a formal request to the United Nations. In January 2004 the parties signed an agreement to establish a Comisión de de Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad (CICIACS) (Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations). According to the agreement, CICIACS would be charged with “investigating and dismantling illegal groups and clandestine security organizations responsible for threats and attacks against human rights defenders, members of the judiciary, witnesses, labor and other activists, and prosecuting those responsible for their formation and operation”. Although CICIACS would work with the Guatemalan authorities, it would have the option of proceding independently when “in the view of the CICIACS Commissioner, a failure to initiate or continue a prosecution would significantly impede the ability of CICIACS to fulfill its mandate”. CICIACS would comprise a Commissioner appointed by the UN, international and national staff (prosecutors, defense lawyers, investigators, police and military personnel, forensic experts and information technology experts, among others), and a Secretariat, headed by an international official, responsible for support and administration. The structure of CICIACS is an acknowledgement that no Guatemalan institution can be trusted. The agreement granted the commission unprecedented powers, and stated explicitly that: “In the performance of their functions, members of CICIACS shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source.” The Berger Administration, taking office in January 2004, formally supported the creation of CICIACS, but after four months of heated public debate ensued, during which opponents in congress (including those in the party of General Rios Montt and former President Portillo) argued that CICIACS would be a "a loss of national sovereignty" and would "breach the constitution", the two congressional commissions voted against the bill. In August 2004 the constitutional court declared several elements of the agreement to be unconstitutional. Finally, in December, 2007, government of Guatema and the United Nations signed an amended agreement (now known the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, or CICIG) to establish a UN-led Commission to investigate the existence of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations operating in Guatemala and to promote the subsequent prosecution in local courts of individuals involved in these groups. CICIG began its work in early 2008. The WOLA website will provide continuing coverage of this issue. Human Rights Abuses There are constant reports of human rights violations in Guatemala. International human rights organizations having become so sensitized to the situation there, that it is difficult sometimes to gain any perspective as to whether the situation is improving or regressing. Violence and Personal Security Certainly ordinary citizens of Guatemala have the perception that the streets and countryside are more dangerous than ever. Gang violence has rendered many zones of the capital 'no-go' areas, and many of the towns and much of the countryside are plagued with all forms of disorganized crime and banditry. Bus drivers in the capital city have recently been targeted for robberies and shootings. Violence not only affects personal security and quality of life, but also greatly increases the costs for anyone trying to run a legitimate business or provide social services in Guatemala.